Review of Roy Sorensen, Seeing Dark Things. The Philosophy of Shadows (Oxford University Press, 2008) (forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy)
Review of Alter, T. and S. Walter (eds.) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2007) (forthcoming in Mind)
Shadows of constitution (The Monist, Vol. 90, No/ 3, July 2007)
Abstract: Mainstream metaphysics has been preoccupied by inquiring into the nature of major kinds of entities, like objects, properties and events, while avoiding minor entities, like shadows or holes. However, one might want to hope that dealing with such minor entities could be profitable for even solving puzzles about major entities. I propose a new ontological puzzle, the Shadow of Constitution Puzzle, incorporating the old puzzle of material constitution, with shadows in the role ofthe minor entity to guide our approach to the issues involved. I then analyze the standard answers to the original puzzle of constitution, in their role as potential solutions to the new puzzle. Finally, I discuss three views that can solve the proposed puzzle.
Abstract: Mainstream metaphysics has been preoccupied by inquiring into the nature of major kinds of entities, like objects, properties and events, while avoiding minor entities, like shadows or holes. However, one might want to hope that dealing with such minor entities could be profitable for even solving puzzles about major entities. I propose a new ontological puzzle, the Shadow of Constitution Puzzle, incorporating the old puzzle of material constitution, with shadows in the role ofthe minor entity to guide our approach to the issues involved. I then analyze the standard answers to the original puzzle of constitution, in their role as potential solutions to the new puzzle. Finally, I discuss three views that can solve the proposed puzzle.
Excluding exclusion: the natural(istic) dualist approach (Philosophical Explorations. forthcoming in March 2008.)
Abstract: The exclusion problem for mental causation is one of the most discussed mind-body puzzles. A solution to it is usually put forth either as an argument for one mind-body view or another, or as a way to compatibilize such a view with the most acceptable assumptions behind the problem. There have been two main approaches to this problem. The first is put forth as an argument for reductive physicalism, and implicitly against nonreductive physicalism and a fortiori against mind-body dualism. The second approach is less combative, and is concerned with saving nonreductive physicalism from the potential danger of either mental-physical overdetermination, or mental epiphenomenalism. However, there has been a general agreement among philosophers, especially because most of them are committed to some form of physicalism, that the exclusion problem cannot be escaped by the dualist. I argue that a proper understanding of dualism --its form, commitments, and intuitions—makes the exclusion problem irrelevant from the dualist perspective. The paper proposes a dualist approach and solution to the exclusion problem, based on a theory of event causation, according to which events are neither fine-grained (Jaegwon Kim), nor coarse-grained (Donald Davidson), but medium-grained, namely, parsed into mental and physical property components. A theory of contrastive mental causation is built upon this theory of events, for which the problem of exclusion does not arise.
